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Abstract
Theoretical analyses of industrial policy normally restrict the range of
possible outcomes by abstracting from either market or government
failures. This paper thus studies industrial policy and its eﬀectiveness
in a model that includes both market and government imperfections.
We introduce a public agency responsible for industrial policy into the
model of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), and assume that this agency
has limited information and is partly politically motivated. We further
extend the model to allow the public agency to communicate with en-
trepreneurs and the entrepreneurs to engage in rent seeking. We ﬁnd
that industrial policies are ineﬀective if the public agency is poorly
informed, but that they are not necessarily ineﬀective if the public
agency is highly politically motivated. Given a highly politically mo-
tivated public agency, industrial policies are eﬀective if and only if the
institutional setting ensures that such policies are modest e.g. by re-
stricting the public agency’s budget. Moreover, our model helps us to
understand why the same industrial policies that have failed elsewhere
have been relatively successful in South Korea and Taiwan.
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Economy
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11 Introduction
Some economists suggest that industrial policies1 should be used in develop-
ing countries to circumvent market failures that hinder development. Others
believe that industrial policies themselves hinder development because of
government failures. Most of the evidence from the post-World War II era
supports the latter view.2 However, there are some East Asian countries,
most notably South Korea and Taiwan, that have used industrial policies
widely and that have developed extraordinarily fast.3 There is no consensus,
but it is plausible that industrial policies have contributed to these coun-
tries’ extraordinary performance.4 Two related questions therefore arise:
Why have industrial policies been relatively successful in South Korea and
Taiwan while they have failed elsewhere? And, what institutional setting
makes industrial policies eﬀective?
In their search for answers, many studies in the vast literature on indus-
trial policies focus on the relatively successful industrial policies of South
Korea and Taiwan (e.g. Pack and Westphal 1986, Amsden 1989, Wade 1990,
Chang 1994, and Rodrik 1995a) or compare the industrial policies of these
countries with the less successful industrial policies of others (e.g. Datta-
Chaudhuri 1990, Evans 1995, and Rodrik 1995b). These studies ﬁnd that
the industrial policies of South Korea and Taiwan were characterized by
competent bureaucrats, intensive communication between bureaucrats and
entrepreneurs, social cohesion, and hard, autonomous states ready to cut
public support for unproﬁtable projects.
There is also a large theoretical literature on industrial policies. Most
1In line with most of the literature, we deﬁne industrial policies as selective government
interventions targeted at certain industries or ﬁrms. Industrial policies can take the form
of e.g. subsidies, tax concessions, soft loans, preferential procurement policies, import
restrictions or export promotions.
2Krueger (1995) reviews government interventions in developing countries after World
War II and independence as well as the dismal eﬀects these interventions generally had.
For a good illustration of how government interventions can go wrong, see e.g. Killick’s
(1978) report on Ghana.
3Japan is another well-known example of an East Asian country with extensive indus-
trial policies and rapid growth. We focus primarily on South Korea and Taiwan because
they still had similar income levels as most African countries around 1950 while Japan
was already more than twice as rich (Maddison 1995).
4Appendix A provides a brief summary of the debate about the role played by industrial
policies in the rapidly growing East Asian countries.
2theoretical contributions are however based on models that abstract from
either market or government failures, which in general restricts the range
of possible outcomes: If there are no market failures, industrial policies can
by assumption not do much good, and if there are no government failures,
industrial policies can by assumption not be mismanaged or misused. To our
knowledge, the only contribution analyzing industrial policies in a setting
with market and government failures is Ades and Di Tella (1997) showing
that the direct positive eﬀects of industrial policies on investment are sub-
stantially mitigated by an increase in corruption.5 But since their model
serves primarily to motivate their empirical analysis, it is kept fairly simple.
We attempt a further step towards an industrial policy model that allows for
both market and government failures and that is suﬃciently rich to answer
the questions posed above.
Our industrial policy model builds on Hausmann and Rodrik (2003). In
their model, the proﬁtability of various activities is uncertain and the social
returns on discovering a proﬁtable activity exceed private returns since other
entrepreneurs can easily copy the entrepreneur who discovered that a certain
activity is proﬁtable in the given economy. As a result, too few entrepreneurs
engage in the costly search for proﬁtable activities under laissez-faire such
that industrial policies targeted at entrepreneurs searching for proﬁtable ac-
tivities could potentially increase welfare and foster development. We intro-
duce a public agency into a simpliﬁed version of the Hausmann-Rodrik model
and equip this agency with an industrial policy instrument. Since ”govern-
ments are not omniscient, selﬂess social guardians” (Krueger 1990, p.11), as
critics of industrial policies rightly claim, we assume that this public agency
has limited information and that it does not only care about social welfare,
but also about political motives which lead it to support entrepreneurs who
are politically close rather than those who are more distant. This relates
our model to the seminal contribution of Grossman and Helpman (1994),
which analyzes trade policies under the assumption that public authorities
care about social welfare and about certain political motives.6
5Models with both market and government failures are not only scarce in the industrial
policy literature, but much more generally. Notable exceptions include Laﬀont and Tirole
(1991), Gradstein (1993), Banerjee (1997), and Acemoglu and Verdier (2000).
6Our results and those of Grossman and Helpman (1994) are independent of whether
or not public authorities care about social welfare because they are partly benevolent or
3The main ﬁndings from our industrial policy model are that if the public
agency is poorly informed, industrial policies are ineﬀective or even harmful,
but that this is not necessarily so if the public agency is highly politically mo-
tivated. Given a highly politically motivated public agency, industrial policies
increase welfare and foster development if and only if the public agency has
a small budget (or a relatively hostile attitude towards entrepreneurs). Po-
litically motivated agencies are thus not a reason to abstain from industrial
policies altogether, but a reason for an institutional setting that ensures that
such policies are modest.
Several other ﬁndings help in understanding why industrial policies have
been relatively successful in South Korea and Taiwan. First, we ﬁnd that
highly competent bureaucrats, as observed in these two countries, raise the
eﬀectiveness of industrial policies by increasing the support for projects that
are expected to be proﬁtable as well as the share of projects that are expected
to be proﬁtable and that turn out to be so. The reason for the former is that
higher competence and better information make it more costly for the public
agency - in terms of foregone welfare - to support close entrepreneurs with
projects it expects to be unproﬁtable. Second, we ﬁnd that industrial policies
are more eﬀective, the lower the variability in the entrepreneurs’ distances
from the public agency. The ethnic homogeneity in South Korea and also in
Taiwan may thus have contributed to the success of these countries’ industrial
policies.
We extend our model in two directions: First, we investigate what hap-
pens when the public agency can talk to entrepreneurs about their projects.
We ﬁnd that communication enables the public agency to learn more about
the diﬀerent projects even if entrepreneurs with unproﬁtable projects can
often convince the public agency that their projects are proﬁtable. A benev-
olent public agency thus communicates with entrepreneurs, which raises the
eﬀectiveness of industrial policies, while a purely politically motivated public
agency has no incentive to do so. Second, we investigate what happens when
entrepreneurs can engage in costly rent seeking activities to come closer to
the public agency. We ﬁnd that rent seeking can lead to a socially superior
allocation of the public agency’s budget if this budget is small or if bene-
because the probability of staying in oﬃce increases in social welfare.
4ﬁts from public support are low for entrepreneurs with unproﬁtable projects.
The former implies that the potential presence of rent seeking is yet another
reason for ensuring that industrial policies are modest.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces
and solves the baseline industrial policy model. Section 3 extends this model
and allows the public agency to communicate with entrepreneurs. Section 4
allows for rent seeking. Results indicating why industrial policies may have
been more successful in South Korea and Taiwan than elsewhere are directly
discussed in these sections. The normative question about the optimal insti-
tutional setting is answered in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Industrial Policy Model
This section presents the baseline model: Section 2.1 introduces the setting.
Section 2.2 looks at the laissez-faire case and the industrial policy of a benev-
olent public agency. Section 2.3 solves the model for the more realistic case
in which the public agency is at least partly politically motivated.
2.1 The Setting
There is an ”industrial policy agency” (henceforth IPA) and a continuum of
risk-neutral entrepreneurs with mass one. Each entrepreneur is associated
with one project that is new in the given economy. It is common knowledge
that α ∈ (0,1) projects are proﬁtable. These projects lead to private returns
with net present value π > 0 and to social returns with net present value
Π ≥ π. The other 1−α projects are unproﬁtable and lead to zero private and
social returns. Entrepreneurs and the IPA have imperfect information about
each single project’s proﬁtability (see below), and an investment is required
to discover whether or not a certain project is indeed proﬁtable.7
7The uncertainty about the diﬀerent projects’ proﬁtability and social returns that ex-
ceed private returns are the key features of the model of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003).
They argue that it is highly uncertain which ”modern-sector activities” are proﬁtable in
a given developing country and that the social returns to discovering that e.g. cutting
ﬂowers, producing soccer balls or programming software is proﬁtable exceed the private
returns because other entrepreneurs can easily copy the entrepreneur who discovered that
such an activity is proﬁtable (as there are no patents for an entrepreneur who discovered
that such an activity is proﬁtable in the given country).
5Each entrepreneur can pay the investment costs to discover the proﬁtabil-
ity of her project herself. Alternatively, the investment can be ﬁnanced by
the IPA whose budget allows it to support at most Ω ∈ [0,1] projects. The
budget Ω is set by the government, which may be inﬂuenced by international
donors. The investment costs to discover a project’s proﬁtability are ce if
paid by the entrepreneur, and cg if paid by the IPA. cg could exceed ce be-
cause administration and surveillance may be costly or because industrial
policy may require distortionary taxation, while ce could exceed cg because
entrepreneurs may have to borrow capital at (excessively) high interest rates
due to their projects’ riskiness or due to capital market imperfections.
This possibility that the IPA can ﬁnance the investment costs to discover
the proﬁtability of the projects of some entrepreneurs is the industrial policy
instrument available in our model. It is fairly general and therefore well-
suited for our analysis.8 It corresponds to oﬀering subsidies if no repayment
is required, and to providing venture capital if entrepreneurs must repay
the investment costs or parts of their private returns in case of success.9 It
is appropriate to investigate cross-country diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of
industrial policy with a model with a single policy instrument since ”the
diﬀerences between Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, on the one side, and most
less successful industrializing countries, on the other side, are not to be found
in the use of diﬀerent policy instruments. The diﬀerences are to be found
instead in diﬀerent ways of using the same policy instruments” (Pack and
Westphal 1986, p. 102-103).10
As mentioned earlier, entrepreneurs and the IPA have imperfect informa-
tion about the diﬀerent projects’ proﬁtability (before they invest to discover
a project’s true proﬁtability). In particular, we assume that for each project
the corresponding entrepreneur e and the IPA g receive either a good sig-
nal sπ
i or a bad signal s0
i, where i = e,g. The conditional probability that a




i ) = qi + (1 − qi)α, (1)
8We do not, however, claim that there cannot be any better industrial policy instrument
in the given framework.
9The given industrial policy instrument can also account for import restrictions and
export promotions, which have eﬀects similar to those of subsidies. In this case, cg might
have to include social costs due to price distortions.
10See also Rodrik (1995c).
6where qi ∈ (0,1) measures the signals’ quality. The higher qi, the more
information signals contain. For simplicity, we assume p(sπ
i ) = p(π). Bayes’
law and basic algebra then imply
p(s
π
i |π) = p(π|s
π









i ) = (1 − α)(1 − qi), (3)
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= 1 − (1 − qi)α. (5)
It remains to describe how industrial policy aﬀects aggregate welfare and
the IPA’s utility. Given that no entrepreneur would invest in the absence of





where the expected eﬀect of supporting an entrepreneur is
w1(sg) = p(π|sg)Π − cg (7)
and the eﬀect of not supporting her is w0(sg) = 0.11 Since private returns π
are included in the social returns Π and, hence, in the welfare calculation, W
is independent of whether supported entrepreneurs with proﬁtable projects
must repay parts of the investment costs or of the private returns.
We assume that the IPA is generally inﬂuenced by welfare considerations
as well as by political motives when deciding which entrepreneurs to support.





where the utility from supporting an entrepreneur is
u1 = λw1(sg) + (1 − λ)θ (9)
and the utility from not supporting her is u0 = 0. The IPA’s decision on
whether to support the project of a certain entrepreneur thus depends not
11If some entrepreneurs did invest in the absence of industrial policy and if entrepreneurs
could make their investment decisions after the IPA, industrial policy would have an
additional welfare eﬀect by inﬂuencing the entrepreneurs’ investment decisions (as those
receiving no public support would update their beliefs that their projects are proﬁtable).
7only on the expected welfare eﬀect w1(sg), but also on the IPA’s benev-
olence λ ∈ [0,1] and the entrepreneur’s political closeness to the IPA θ:
The higher λ, the more the IPA cares about social welfare and the less it
cares about supporting close entrepreneurs. The higher θ, the closer an en-
trepreneur is to the IPA and therefore the more likely she is to receive public
support (given λ < 1). For purely political motives, the IPA would like to
support any entrepreneur with θ > 0. Political closeness θ is independent of
the type of project and of the associated signals, and uniformly distributed
in [θ,θ] = [µθ − σθ/2,µθ + σθ/2].12 µθ measures how friendly the IPA’s
attitude towards entrepreneurs is in general, and σθ the variability in the
entrepreneurs’ political closenesses to the IPA.
To make the analysis interesting, we moreover assume
αΠ < min{ce,cg} < Π (10)
such that paying the costs to discover the type of a project can increase
welfare, but that paying the total costs to discover the type of all projects
must lower welfare.
2.2 Laissez-Faire and Benevolent Industrial Policy
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze under what conditions some entrepreneurs
would invest in their projects under laissez-faire, i.e. in the absence of gov-
ernment interventions. We then consider under what conditions a benevolent
IPA can use industrial policy to increase welfare given that there would be
no investment under laissez-faire.
An entrepreneur pays the investment costs ce to discover whether her
project is proﬁtable if and only if the expected private net return is positive,
i.e. if and only if13
p(π|se)π − ce > 0. (11)
Entrepreneurs receiving bad signals s0
e never invest because p(π|s0
e)π ≤ απ ≤
αΠ < ce. Equation (1) and condition (11) imply that entrepreneurs receiving
good signals sπ







12In section 4, entrepreneurs can engage in rent seeking to get closer to the IPA. Close-
ness θ may thus become endogenous and potentially dependent on the type of project.
13We assume that entrepreneurs and the IPA never invest if they are indiﬀerent.
8Note that q′
e > 0 because απ < ce, that q′
e < 1 if and only if π > ce, and that
q′
e ∈ (0,1) increases in ce, but decreases in α and π. It follows
Proposition 1 Under laissez-faire, all entrepreneurs with good signals sπ
e
invest if qe > q′
e, but no entrepreneur invests otherwise.
The likelihood that no entrepreneur invests in a new project and, conse-
quently, that there is no development under laissez-faire thus decreases in
the quality qe of their signals, in the share α of proﬁtable projects and in
the private returns π on these projects, but increases in the entrepreneurs’
investment costs ce.
We next analyze under what conditions a benevolent IPA, i.e. an IPA
with λ = 1, increases welfare and fosters development given that there would
be no investment under laissez-faire, i.e. given qe ≤ q′
e. Equation (7) implies
that the expected welfare eﬀect of supporting an average project is E(w1) =
αΠ − cg, which is negative by assumption (10).
Equations (4) and (7) imply that the expected welfare eﬀect of supporting










Π − cg = (1 − qg)αΠ − cg, (13)





≤ α and E(w1) < 0. That is, the
expected welfare eﬀect of supporting projects with s0
g must be negative since
even supporting an average project is in expectation welfare decreasing.
Equations (1) and (7) imply that the expected welfare eﬀect of supporting














Π − cg = [qg + (1 − qg)α]Π − cg, (14)








g > 0 because αΠ < cg, that q′
g < 1 if and only if Π > cg, and
that q′
g ∈ (0,1) increases in cg, but decreases in α and Π. It follows
Proposition 2 Given no investment under laissez-faire, a benevolent IPA
invests in as many projects with good signals sπ
g as possible, i.e. in min(α,Ω)
such projects, if qg > q′
g, but in no project otherwise.
9Hence, industrial policy cannot increase welfare if the quality qg of the IPA’s
signals is not suﬃciently high, i.e. if the IPA is not suﬃciently well-informed.
Proposition 2 further implies that signals must be of higher quality, the higher
the IPA’s investment costs cg and the lower the share α of proﬁtable projects
and the social returns Π on these projects.
Propositions 1 and 2 jointly imply that it is more likely that a benevolent
IPA can increase welfare and foster development in a country that would
not develop otherwise, the higher qg relative to qe, the higher Π relative to
π and the lower cg relative to ce. Hence, a benevolent IPA may be able to
increase welfare even if its signals sg are of considerably lower quality than
the entrepreneurs’ signals se given that cg is substantially lower than ce or Π
substantially higher than π.
Before discussing the more interesting case in which the IPA is at least
partly politically motivated, we comment brieﬂy on the relationship between
benevolent industrial policy, welfare and development. Suppose there are two
countries, A and B: Condition (12) is violated in A, but holds in B e.g. be-
cause of a higher share α of proﬁtable projects. Given that condition (15)
holds, a benevolent IPA can increase welfare in A, but perhaps not in B.14
Welfare and aggregate investments may nevertheless be lower in A than in
B e.g. because there are fewer proﬁtable projects. This leads to
Corollary 1 Countries that perform badly may optimally have more active
industrial policy than countries that perform well.
A negative relationship between industrial policy and development there-
fore does not necessarily imply that industrial policy is lowering welfare and
hindering development. Hence, this corollary warns that results from cross-
country regressions of, say, growth rates on (industrial) policy variables must
be interpreted very cautiously.
We subsequently focus our discussion on the case in which market failures
are suﬃciently severe to retard development under laissez-faire, but in which
industrial policy could potentially increase welfare and foster development.
That is, we assume that condition (15) holds while condition (12) does not
hold.
14A benevolent IPA may not be able to increase welfare in B if cg > ce or qg < qe.
102.3 Industrial Policy by a Politically Motivated Agency
In this section, we derive the industrial policy that maximizes the utility U
of an IPA which is at least partly politically motivated. We further analyze
how this industrial policy aﬀects welfare W, and we discuss how our ﬁndings
can help to explain why industrial policies have been relatively successful in
South Korea and Taiwan while they have failed in many other developing
countries.
Following on from discussing the case of a completely benevolent IPA, we
now ﬁrst look at the other boundary case: If the IPA is entirely politically
motivated, i.e. if λ = 0, it uses industrial policy exclusively to support close
entrepreneurs. In particular, it supports all entrepreneurs with θ > 0 if its
budget Ω is not binding, i.e. if Ω > (θ−0)/(θ−θ) = θ/σθ, and the Ω closest
entrepreneurs otherwise. Since an entrepreneur’s closeness θ is independent
of her project’s type and the associated signals, the average expected welfare
eﬀect of a supported project equals E(w1). Since E(w1) < 0, it follows that
W < 0 if λ = 0. Hence, industrial policy pursued by an entirely politically
motivated IPA is socially harmful even if there is no investment and no
development under laissez-faire.
The remainder of this section focuses on the intermediate case λ ∈ (0,1)
in which the IPA’s behavior is inﬂuenced by welfare considerations as well
as by political motives. We ﬁrst analyze the case in which the IPA’s budget
Ω is binding. We then brieﬂy discuss the case in which the IPA can support
all the entrepreneurs it wants to support because Ω is not binding.
Case 1: Binding budget
The budget Ω is binding when the IPA cannot support all the entrepreneurs it
would like to support.15 The IPA supports in this case those Ω entrepreneurs
that yield the highest utility u1. To ﬁnd out which entrepreneurs these are,
we ﬁrst look at how the IPA would decide if it could only support one out of
two entrepreneurs it would like to support.
If the IPA must decide between two entrepreneurs for which it has received
the same signal, it supports the closer. Even though this may seem unfair,
it does not aﬀect welfare W as political closeness θ is independent of the
15Condition (23) will state precisely when Ω is (not) binding.
11project’s type and the associated signals.
Now suppose that the IPA must decide between an entrepreneur with
signal sπ
g and closeness θsπ
g and an entrepreneur with s0
g and θs0
g. It follows

















   ˜ λ = qg˜ λΠ (16)
with ˜ λ ≡ λ/(1−λ), where the equality follows from equations (13) and (14).
Given Ω < α, the closest Ω entrepreneurs with projects for which the IPA
has received a good signal sπ










It follows from conditions (16) and (17) that the IPA supports only projects
with sπ







Since θ is uniformly distributed, the IPA uses ﬁnancial resources exceeding
Ω′ to support projects with good signals sπ
g and projects with bad signals s0
g
proportionally unless no project with sπ
g remains. That is, if Ω ≥ Ω′, the





Proposition 3 The share of supported projects with good signals sπ
g in-
creases in the IPA’s benevolence λ, the quality qg of its signals, the share
α of proﬁtable projects and the social returns Π, but decreases in the IPA’s
budget Ω and the variability in the entrepreneurs’ closenesses σθ.
Some results to which we will refer at the end of this section deserve a brief
discussion: First, higher quality signals increase the support for projects with
good signals sπ
g (relative to the support for projects with s0
g) since they make
it more costly for the IPA - in terms of forgone welfare - to support close
entrepreneurs with bad signals s0
g. In addition, higher quality signals also
16We assume that the IPA supports the closer entrepreneur if it is indiﬀerent.
17Subsequently, increasing and decreasing stand for monotonically increasing and mono-
tonically decreasing, respectively.
12directly increase the support for proﬁtable projects as the share of proﬁtable
projects with good signals increases. Second, an increase in the variability
in the entrepreneurs’ closenesses σθ has the same eﬀect as a decrease in
the IPA’s benevolence λ since it also increases the importance of political
considerations for the IPA.
We next investigate how the industrial policy described aﬀects welfare. If
Ω < Ω′, the IPA behaves as if it were benevolent and supports only projects
with good signals sπ






Since condition (15) guarantees that w1(sπ
g) > 0, W(Ω < Ω′) is positive
and increasing in the IPA’s budget Ω. It follows from equation (14) that
W(Ω < Ω′) further increases in qg, α and Π while it decreases in cg.
If Ω ≥ Ω′, the IPA supports α′ projects with sπ
g and Ω−α′ projects with
s0









which can be positive or negative. Again, it increases in qg, α and Π, but de-
creases in cg. Since W(Ω ≥ Ω′) also increases in Ω′, it is moreover increasing
in λ and decreasing in σθ. The welfare eﬀect of a marginal increase in the





g) + (1 − α)w1(s
0
g) = E(w1) < 0. (21)
That is, welfare decreases in Ω if Ω ≥ Ω′ since the support for projects with
sπ
g increases at most proportionally to the support for projects with s0
g (the
ﬁrst inequality) and because even raising the support for both project types
proportionally lowers welfare (the second inequality).
It follows
Proposition 4 If the IPA is partly politically motivated and if the IPA’s
budget Ω is binding, the welfare eﬀect W of industrial policy is a hump-
shaped function of Ω: It is positive and increasing in Ω if Ω < Ω′, but starts
decreasing and eventually becomes negative if Ω ≥ Ω′. The turning point
Ω′ and W itself both increase in the IPA’s benevolence λ, the quality qg of
its signals, the share α of proﬁtable projects and the social returns Π, but
13Figure 1: Welfare W and the IPA’s budget Ω
decrease in the variability in the entrepreneurs’ closenesses σθ. W further
decreases in the investment costs cg.
The hump-shaped relationship between W and Ω is illustrated in Figure 1.
Proposition 4 implies that industrial policy increases welfare W even if
the IPA is highly politically motivated given that the IPA’s budget Ω is
suﬃciently small.18 The reason is that if the IPA cares at least marginally
about social welfare, it always prefers to support projects it expects to be
proﬁtable when having the choice between diﬀerent projects of equally close
entrepreneurs. Even a highly (but not entirely) politically motivated IPA
supports therefore ﬁrst projects it expects to be proﬁtable such that industrial
policy increases welfare whenever the budget Ω allows only supporting a
few projects. Moreover, proposition 4 implies that the welfare-maximizing
budget Ω′ exceeds zero whenever λ > 0, and that it is the larger, the higher
λ, qg, α and Π and the lower σθ. We will come back to these results when
presenting policy and institutional implications in section 5.
We next discuss how our baseline model can help in understanding why
industrial policies have been successful in some countries, most notably South
Korea and Taiwan, while they have failed elsewhere. We have ﬁrstly seen
that it is impossible for public agencies with poor information to conduct
welfare-increasing industrial policies. This is already suﬃcient to explain
why industrial policies have failed in certain countries where public agencies
are known to lack competence.
18This result is not driven by the continuity of the distribution of θ. If this distribution
were discrete and if β > 0 entrepreneurs were in the closest group, the welfare-maximizing
budget Ω would be at least αβ whenever λ > 0.
14But even if public agencies are suﬃciently competent to enable industrial
policies to work, the eﬀectiveness of such policies still increases in the compe-
tence and the benevolence of these agencies. Observers of South Korea and
Taiwan often highlight that the industrial policies in these countries were con-
ducted by unusually competent bureaucrats (e.g. Pack and Westphal 1986,
and Wade 1990): This could hence be a reason why industrial policies have
been relatively eﬀective in these countries. Whether public agencies were
also more benevolent in East Asia than elsewhere is, however, debatable.19
Moreover, our model shows that a low variability in the entrepreneurs’
closenesses to the relevant public agencies (i.e. a low σθ) has the same positive
eﬀect on the eﬀectiveness of industrial policies as a low political motivation
of these agencies (i.e. a high λ). Since political closeness may well depend on
ethnicity, its variability can be expected to increase in ethnic fractionaliza-
tion. The model then predicts that industrial policies tend to be more eﬀec-
tive, the less ethnically fractionalized a country is. The indices of ethnic frac-
tionalization20 compiled by Alesina et al. (2003) imply that South Korea and
Japan are the two least ethnically fractionalized countries in the world (be-
sides Comoros). In Taiwan, ethnic fractionalization is somewhat higher - but
still relatively low - since the population includes both islanders (about 6/7 of
the population) and mainlanders. However, Wade (1990, p. 340) highlights
the homogeneity within the Taiwanese population and the small diﬀerences
between entrepreneurs from the island and the mainland. Industrial policies
may thus have been relatively eﬀective in these three countries because the
ethnic homogeneity has lead to a low variability in the entrepreneurs’ close-
nesses to the relevant public agencies and because this low variability has
reduced the importance of political considerations for these agencies.21
We next illustrate that ethnic fractionalization may not only help to ex-
plain why industrial policies have succeeded in some countries, but also why
the have failed in others. Evans (1995) analyzes industrial policies in Brazil,
19For anecdotal evidence of South Korean public agencies far from benevolent see
e.g. Ades and Di Tella (1997).
20The index of ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly
selected individuals of a certain country belong to diﬀerent ethnic groups.
21Similarly, it has been argued that social cohesion was important for enabling indus-
trial policies to work in South Korea and Taiwan (e.g. Chang 1994, and Rodrik 1995a).
However, it is homogeneity in the entrepreneurs’ distances from public agencies rather
than low inequalities within the entire society that matters according to our model.
15India, South Korea and (former) Zaire during the emergence of the computer
industry. He ﬁnds that industrial policies have been successful in South Ko-
rea, sometimes helping and sometimes hindering in Brazil and India, and
disastrous in Zaire. In a similar vein, Rodrik (1995b) presents case studies
of export subsidization. He ﬁnds that export subsidization was a success
in Brazil and South Korea, a failure in Bolivia and Kenya, and somewhat
in between in India and Turkey. Interestingly, Bolivia, Kenya and (former)
Zaire are by far the most ethnically fractionalized of all these countries while
South Korea is by far the most ethnically homogeneous.22 As in Kenya and
Zaire, industrial policies have also failed on a large scale in many other highly
ethnically fractionalized sub-Saharan African countries. Our model suggests
that industrial policies tend to fail in such countries because high fractional-
ization and the associated high variability in the entrepreneurs’ closenesses to
the relevant public agencies raises the importance of political considerations
for these agencies.
Case 2: Non-binding budget
Let us now brieﬂy look at the case in which the IPA can support all the
entrepreneurs it wants to support because its budget Ω is not binding.
It follows from the utility function (9) that the IPA supports an en-
trepreneur with closeness θ and signal sj
g if and only if ˜ λw1(sj
g) + θ > 0.
Hence, the IPA supports αΦ(sπ
g) projects with sπ
































For the IPA’s budget not to be binding, it must therefore hold that
Ω ≥ αΦ(s
π
g) + (1 − α)Φ(s
0
g). (23)










22The index of ethnic fractionalization is 0.00 for South Korea, 0.32 for Turkey, 0.42 for
India, 0.54 for Brazil, 0.74 for Bolivia, 0.86 for Kenya and 0.87 for Zaire (Alesina et al.
2003).
16Figure 2: Welfare W and the IPA’s attitude towards entrepreneurs µθ
If µθ ≤ µ′
θ ≡ −˜ λw1(sπ
g)−σθ/2, the IPA’s attitude towards entrepreneurs is so
hostile that the IPA does not support any project. Hence, W(µθ ≤ µ′
θ) = 0.
If the IPA’s attitude towards entrepreneurs is somewhat less hostile such
that µ′
θ < µθ < µ′′
θ ≡ −˜ λw1(s0
g) − σθ/2, the IPA supports only projects with
sπ
g. W(µ′
θ < µθ < µ′′
θ) is thus positive and increasing in µθ. But if the IPA
is relatively friendly towards entrepreneurs such that µθ ≥ µ′′
θ, it supports
projects with s0
g as well. Hence, W(µθ ≥ µ′′







g) + (1 − α)w1(s
0
g) = E(w1) < 0. (25)
It follows
Proposition 5 If the IPA is partly politically motivated and if the IPA’s
budget Ω is not binding, the welfare eﬀect W of industrial policy is a hump-
shaped function of the IPA’s attitude towards entrepreneurs µθ: W is weakly
positive and increasing if µθ < µ′′
θ, but starts decreasing and eventually be-
comes negative if µθ ≥ µ′′
θ.
The hump-shaped relationship between W and µθ is illustrated in Figure 2.
Moreover, W again increases in λ, qg and Π while it decreases in cg.
Hence, a change in the IPA’s attitude towards entrepreneurs µθ when Ω
is not binding has a very similar welfare eﬀect W to that of a change in the
IPA’s budget Ω when this is binding. To avoid repetitions, we subsequently
assume that Ω is binding, which requires Ω to be suﬃciently small relative
to µθ. It can however be deduced how a change in µθ would aﬀect the results
from how a change in Ω does.
173 Communication
In the previous section, we excluded - quite unrealistically - interactions
between the IPA and entrepreneurs. We therefore present some extensions
to our baseline industrial policy model in which the IPA and entrepreneurs
can interact. We focus on communication in this section and on rent seeking
in the next.
Many studies of South Korea and Taiwan highlight the intensive commu-
nication between public agencies and entrepreneurs and most of them claim
that this communication has been crucial for the success of industrial policies
in these countries (e.g. Pack and Westphal 1986, Wade 1990, Evans 1995, and
Rodrik 1995b).23 As pointed out by Rodrik (2004), this however is in stark
contrast with the popular belief that public agencies should be kept at arm’s
length from entrepreneurs. In section 3.1, we allow the IPA to talk to en-
trepreneurs about their projects and we investigate how this possibility aﬀects
industrial policy and its eﬀectiveness given that entrepreneurs with unprof-
itable projects can often convince the IPA that they expect their projects to
be proﬁtable. This extension can explain why we may indeed observe inten-
sive communication in countries with relatively successful industrial policies
and why intensive communication can contribute to the success of industrial
policies.
In section 3.2, we brieﬂy show that the government or the IPA can, in
certain circumstances, induce entrepreneurs to invest simply by communi-
cating its signals, i.e. by informing the entrepreneurs what it knows about
their projects.
3.1 When the IPA tries to learn from entrepreneurs
We now extend our baseline industrial policy model and allow the IPA to
talk to entrepreneurs about their projects before deciding which projects to
support. We investigate under what conditions the IPA can learn from such
talks, and we show with whom the IPA chooses to talk and whom it then
chooses to support.
For the IPA, the potential beneﬁt from talking to an entrepreneur about
23Some of these studies, most notably Evans (1995), argue that it is the simultaneity of
intensive communication and state autonomy that matters.
18her project is that it may learn what she knows about the proﬁtability of her
project, i.e. it may learn her signal. However, entrepreneurs try to mislead
the IPA and to convince it that they have received a good signal sπ
e since this
increases the probability of receiving public support. The signals that the
IPA receives from talking to entrepreneurs may therefore be heavily biased.
We assume that each entrepreneur to whom the IPA talks can mislead the
IPA with probability κ ∈ [0,1]. In this case, the entrepreneur can convince
the IPA that she has received a good signal sπ
e and the IPA receives a good
interaction signal sπ
eg, independently of the signal the entrepreneur really
received. With probability 1 − κ, the IPA learns the entrepreneur’s true
signal such that si
eg = si
e. The IPA however may not know whether or not
she learns the true signal.24,25
First, we should emphasize that the IPA can learn from talking to en-
trepreneurs about their projects even if entrepreneurs can often mislead the
IPA:
Proposition 6 If the IPA talks to an entrepreneur about her project, the
IPA’s belief about the proﬁtability of this project becomes more accurate unless


















for j = π,0 unless κ = 1.
The proof is given in appendix B.
The reason why the IPA can in general learn from talking to an en-
trepreneur is that the interaction signal seg contains some information when-
ever the entrepreneur cannot mislead the IPA with certainty (since qe > 0).
This information then allows the IPA to update its beliefs about the corre-
sponding project’s proﬁtability using Bayes’ law.26
We subsequently assume κ < 1 such that the IPA can learn from talking
to entrepreneurs, and we investigate whether the IPA actually wants to talk
to certain entrepreneurs about their projects and whether it ﬁnally supports
mainly entrepreneurs it has talked to or mainly entrepreneurs it has not
talked to. We assume that the IPA is willing to talk to an entrepreneur if it
24Alternatively, one could assume that entrepreneurs with whom the IPA interacts suc-
ceed with probability κ in gaining the IPA’s sympathy and that the IPA then treats these
entrepreneurs as if they received good signals sπ
e.
25The subsequent results are robust to the addition of some noise.
26This would hold even if κ were unknown to the IPA because the IPA can derive κ
from the interaction signals whenever it interacts with a positive mass of entrepreneurs.
19accepts a small disutility ε → 0 for talking to her. We focus on the cases in
which the IPA is entirely politically motivated (λ = 0) or benevolent (λ = 1),
which is suﬃcient to grasp the main pattern.
An entirely politically motivated IPA is only interested in supporting
the closest Ω entrepreneurs. Its decisions are therefore independent of its
beliefs about the diﬀerent projects’ proﬁtabilities. Hence, it is not willing to
accept any disutility for more accurate beliefs and chooses not to talk to any
entrepreneur about her project.27
Now suppose the IPA is benevolent and Ω ≤ αp(sπ
eg|sπ
g). If the IPA knew
the interaction signals seg of all projects, it would support only projects with




















But since talking to entrepreneurs is costly, the IPA does not talk to any
entrepreneur with s0








IPA then receives a good interaction signal sπ
eg (in addition to sπ
g) for exactly
Ω entrepreneurs. Even though the share κ/
 







entrepreneurs is able to mislead the IPA, their projects are, on average, more
likely to be proﬁtable than the project of an average entrepreneur with sπ
g, ex-
actly because the interaction signals contain some information nevertheless.
The IPA therefore supports all those projects for which it receives sπ
eg.






, a benevolent IPA’s behavior depends on Ω and on












Π. In particular, we can
distinguish the following ﬁve cases:














: The IPA talks to all entrepreneurs
with sπ














: Given Ω < α, the IPA talks to all
entrepreneurs with sπ
g and supports all those with sπ
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> cg/Π: For Ω < α, see case 2. Given Ω ≥ α,
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27In a diﬀerent setting with uncertainty about the entrepreneurs’ political closenesses θ
an entirely politically motivated IPA may talk to entrepreneurs to get more accurate
beliefs about θ. We do however think that bureaucrats are in general well aware how close
diﬀerent entrepreneurs are.









































g. It further talks to all other entrepreneurs and sup-
ports all those with sπ
eg.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 7 An entirely politically motivated IPA never talks to an en-
trepreneur.
A benevolent IPA talks to entrepreneurs with good signals sπ
g and supports
only entrepreneurs to whom it has talked (even when they often mislead it)
if Ω ≤ αp(sπ
eg|sπ















erwise, it talks to some entrepreneurs and then supports some of these en-













This proposition has several implications worth emphasizing: First, a benev-
olent IPA with a small budget Ω or relatively high investment costs cg talks
to entrepreneurs to learn more about their projects’ proﬁtability, which is
possible - as shown earlier - even if entrepreneurs can often mislead the IPA.
Second (and closely related to the ﬁrst point), a benevolent IPA with small Ω
or high cg supports only entrepreneurs to which it has talked even if it might
be misled by most of these entrepreneurs. This choice is neither malevo-
lent, nor naive; it is (socially) optimal. Providing a benevolent IPA with the
possibility to talk to entrepreneurs therefore increases the welfare eﬀect W
of industrial policy. Third, a highly politically motivated IPA is not inter-
ested in costly talks about the proﬁtability of diﬀerent projects since it cares
only about supporting close friends and allies, which it can support anyway.
Allowing a highly politically motivated IPA to talk to entrepreneurs about
their projects does not therefore aﬀect welfare W as such an IPA does not
use this possibility.
Hence, the intensive communication between public agencies and vari-
ous entrepreneurs observed in South Korea and Taiwan and the fact that
these entrepreneurs were more likely to receive public support than others
does not necessarily imply that public agencies were highly politically mo-
tivated in these countries. According to our model, the opposite could be
true; i.e. that public agencies were relatively benevolent and therefore talked
21to entrepreneurs to learn about their projects, and that they supported en-
trepreneurs to whom they talked to as these entrepreneurs were on average
more likely to have proﬁtable projects than other entrepreneurs. Because of
the latter, it is moreover possible that the intensive communication with en-
trepreneurs improved the public agencies’ budget allocation and contributed
thereby substantially to the success of industrial policies in South Korea and
Taiwan.
3.2 When the IPA shares its information
In this section, we brieﬂy analyze under what circumstances the government
or the IPA can induce entrepreneurs to invest simply by communicating the
signals sg it has received for the diﬀerent projects. Note that such a policy
does not require the IPA to pay any investment costs.
We know that entrepreneurs receiving good signals sπ
e invest under laissez-
faire to discover their projects’ proﬁtability if and only if condition (12)
holds, i.e. if and only if qe > q′
e. Similarly, entrepreneurs receiving sπ
e and
knowing that the IPA has also received a good signal sπ















































ce − [qg + (1 − qg)α]π
[qg + (1 − qg)α]π − qgce
. (27)
Condition (27) is less restrictive than condition (12) because q′′
e < q′
e if π > ce
(which follows from q′′
e = q′
e if qg = 0, and ∂q′′
e/∂qg < 0 if π > ce) and because
no entrepreneur would ever invest if π ≤ ce. It follows
Proposition 8 Whenever qe ∈ (q′′
e,q′
e], entrepreneurs with good signals sπ
e
invest if and only if they know that the IPA has also received a good signal sπ
g
for their projects.
This proposition implies that the IPA can increase welfare and foster de-
velopment simply by communicating its signals sg if qe ∈ (q′′
e,q′
e]. The rea-
son is that the additional signal makes the entrepreneurs’ belief about their








probability that this additional signal can induce investment increases in
the signal’s quality qg and depends crucially on the relationship between sg
and se. Put bluntly, the higher the correlation, the less likely it is that
communication can induce some entrepreneurs to invest. Moreover, commu-
nication could not trigger any investment if sg were just a noisy version of
se, because no entrepreneur would then update her belief that her project
is proﬁtable. In addition, the IPA’s announcements could hardly encourage
some entrepreneurs to invest if entrepreneurs did not expect the IPA to tell
the truth.
But even in the given setting, where signals are independent and where the
IPA has no incentive to lie, active industrial policy (as discussed in section 3)
is required to discover the proﬁtability of some projects if qe ≤ q′′
e. It is more
likely that active industrial policy can increase welfare (qg > q′
g) while sharing
information is not enough (qe ≤ q′′
e), the higher Π relative to π and the lower
cg relative to ce.
4 Rent Seeking
In line with Krueger (1990, p. 11), we have already assumed in our base-
line model that public agencies are not ”selﬂess social guardians,” but that
they may act politically. It is often argued, again most prominently by
Krueger (1974) herself, that politically motivated agencies are particularly
harmful because they provoke corruption, lobbying and rent seeking. In this
section, we analyze how such activities, which are henceforth just called rent
seeking, aﬀect industrial policy and its eﬀectiveness. We therefore assume
that the IPA is partly politically motivated, i.e. λ < 1, and that entrepreneurs
can engage in rent seeking to get closer to the IPA and, consequently, to in-
crease the likelihood of public support.
In particular, we assume that each entrepreneur’s closeness is θ unless
she pays the rent seeking costs r, which brings her closer to the IPA, to
θ > θ. These rent seeking costs may either be ﬁnancial costs, such as bribes,
or some other disutilities associated with rent seeking. We further assume







e) is straightforward and similar to the proof of
Proposition 6 with κ = 0.
23that public support leads to utility v(π) for entrepreneurs with proﬁtable
projects and to utility v(0) for entrepreneurs with unproﬁtable projects,
where v(π) ≥ v(0) ≥ 0. Utilities v(π) and v(0) may exceed π and 0, re-
spectively, since public support can lead to certain beneﬁts in addition to
the private returns that would be gained if the entrepreneurs paid the invest-
ment costs themselves. Further, v(π) could deviate from π if entrepreneurs
with proﬁtable projects were required to repay parts of the investment costs
or of their private returns π.
An entrepreneur with signal si
















if she pays the rent seeking





















that an entrepreneur with signal si
g and closeness θ
receives public support is endogenous and dependent on, among other things,












for an entrepreneur with signal si
e given that the
IPA has received signal sj
g. An entrepreneur with si
e thus pays r if and only












































e) measures how much an entrepreneur with signal si
e
is willing to pay for getting closer to the IPA. We subsequently focus on this
willingness to pay. If r(sπ
e) > r(s0
e), entrepreneurs with good signals sπ
e are
more likely to engage in rent seeking than entrepreneurs with bad signals s0
e
in the sense that the former always pay the rent seeking costs r if the latter
do, and that the latter pay r only if the former do. If r(sπ
e) < r(s0
e), the
reverse is true. It can be shown that r(sπ
e) > (<)r(s0

















































29We assume that entrepreneurs never engage in rent seeking if they are indiﬀerent.






and v(π) ≥ v(0) that Ψ(sπ
g) > 0 unless v(π) = v(0) = 0.31 Moreover,
it holds that Ψ(s0














(1 − α)(1 − qg)
(1 − α)(1 − qg) + qg
, (30)
where the equality follows from equations (3) and (5).
We next analyze whether the entrepreneurs with good signals sπ
g or those
with bad signals s0
g are more likely to engage in rent seeking. For that
purpose, we look at two cases that diﬀer in the eﬀectiveness of rent seeking.










. In this case, rent seeking is not
overly eﬀective and the IPA supports a distant entrepreneur with sπ
g rather
than a close entrepreneur with s0
g. It follows from condition (16) that this is
more likely the higher the IPA’s benevolence λ, the social returns Π and the
quality qg of the IPA’s signals and the lower the distance θ −θ between rent
seeking entrepreneurs and others.
Given Ω ∈ (0,α), the IPA does not therefore support any entrepreneur
with a bad signal s0
g and it supports close rather than distant entrepreneurs
with good signals sπ





















. Combined with Ψ(sπ
g) > 0, this implies that condition (29) holds
and, consequently, that r(sπ
e) > r(s0
e). Entrepreneurs who have received a
good signal sπ
e are thus more likely to pay the rent seeking costs r than
entrepreneurs who have received a bad signal s0
e. Rent seeking therefore
makes the IPA weakly more likely to support projects with two good sig-
nals, sπ
e and sπ















, rent seeking thus leads to a socially weakly supe-
rior allocation of the IPA’s budget Ω.32












= 1. But among entrepreneurs with s0
g, it supports











. It follows from conditions (29) and (30) that r(sπ
e) > r(s0
e) and,
consequently, that entrepreneurs with sπ
g are more likely to pay r than those
with s0
g if and only if v(0)/v(π) is suﬃciently low, i.e. if and only if the
31If v(π) = v(0) = 0, then Ψ(sπ
g) = 0. We subsequently ignore this case, in which no
entrepreneur would pay a positive price for an increased likelihood of public support.












is straightforward and similar to the proof
of Proposition 6 with κ = 0.
25proﬁtability of a supported entrepreneur’s project has a suﬃciently strong
eﬀect on the entrepreneur’s beneﬁt from public support. But if v(0)/v(π) is
so high that condition (30) fails to hold, then r(sπ
e) ≤ r(s0
e). Hence, given
Ω ∈ (α,1), rent seeking leads to a socially weakly superior allocation of the
IPA’s budget Ω if v(0)/v(π) is relatively low, but to a socially weakly inferior
budget allocation if v(0)/v(π) is relatively high.33











. If Ω ≤ αβ(sπ
g), where β(sj
g) denotes the share of entrepreneurs
with sj




















= 0. Hence, if Ω is suﬃciently small, en-
trepreneurs with sπ
e are again more likely to pay r than those with s0
e, and
rent seeking leads again to a socially weakly superior allocation of the IPA’s
budget Ω. Moreover, it still holds that rent seeking leads to a socially weakly
superior budget allocation if v(0)/v(π) is suﬃciently low for condition (30)
to hold. But given that v(0)/v(π) is relatively high, entrepreneurs with
s0
e are more likely to pay r than those with sπ
e if Ω ≥ α + (1 − α)β(s0
g),
while it is ambiguous which entrepreneurs are more likely to pay r if Ω ∈
 
αβ(sπ




The eﬀect of rent seeking on welfare or on the welfare eﬀect of industrial
policy W, respectively, depends on how rent seeking aﬀects the IPA’s budget
allocation and on whether rent seeking costs r represent transfers or social
waste. If rent seeking leads to a socially superior allocation of Ω and if r
represents bribes or other transfers, rent seeking increases W. If rent seeking
leads to a socially superior allocation of Ω, but r represents social waste, the
welfare eﬀect of rent seeking is ambiguous. And whenever rent seeking leads
to a socially inferior allocation of Ω, rent seeking must lower W.
It follows from our discussion:
Proposition 9 Rent seeking leads to a socially weakly superior allocation
of the IPA’s budget Ω if Ω is suﬃciently small or v(0)/v(π) is suﬃciently
low. In these cases, rent seeking may increase the welfare eﬀect of industrial
policy W.
In section 2, we have shown that an IPA with a small budget Ω supports
mainly proﬁtable projects in absence of rent seeking. Proposition 9 implies
33If Ω = 0,α,1, nobody pays r because the allocation of Ω is independent of θ.
26that rent seeking activities further increase the share of supported projects
that are proﬁtable if Ω is small.
Moreover, rent seeking tends to improve the IPA’s budget allocation if
the proﬁtability of a supported entrepreneur’s project has a relatively strong
eﬀect on an entrepreneur’s beneﬁt from public support, i.e. if v(0)/v(π) is
relatively low. The observation that the states in South Korea and Taiwan
were likely to cut public support for unproﬁtable projects (e.g. Amsden 1989,
and Kim 1993) implies that v(0) was relatively low in these countries. In
South Korea and Taiwan, industrial policies may thus have been relatively
successful and rent seeking not detrimental because rent seeking was more
attractive for entrepreneurs expecting their projects to be proﬁtable than for
entrepreneurs expecting their projects to be unproﬁtable.
An entrepreneur’s political closeness θ to a public agency may in reality
well depend on exogenous factors, such as ethnicity, (as in section 2) as well
as on rent seeking (as in this section). The observation often made that
South Korea and Taiwan had hard, autonomous states (e.g. Amsden 1989,
Wade 1990, Chang 1994, Evans 1995, and Rodrik 1995b) suggests that rent
seeking may have had a smaller eﬀect on an entrepreneur’s political closeness
to public agencies in these countries than elsewhere. This may also help to
explain why rent seeking was not detrimental in South Korea and Taiwan.
5 Policy and Institutional Implications
In this section, we discuss on the basis of our theoretical ﬁndings what insti-
tutional setting should be chosen to make industrial policies eﬀective.
A ﬁrst set of implications follows from the result that the welfare eﬀect
of industrial policy increases in the quality qg of the IPA’s signals and that
industrial policy can only raise welfare if qg is suﬃciently high. The IPA
should thus be equipped with competent staﬀ.34 Further, the institutional
setting should enable and encourage the IPA to collect accurate information
about the diﬀerent projects and to communicate with entrepreneurs as this
will allow the IPA to update its beliefs about the diﬀerent projects’ proﬁtabil-
ity even if entrepreneurs often mislead it. However, if all these measures are
34Rodrik (2004) suggests delegating industrial policy to an existing agency that is known
to be (relatively) competent.
27inadequate to make the IPA suﬃciently well-informed to enable industrial
policy to work, then there should be no industrial policy.
Since the welfare eﬀect of industrial policy further increases in the IPA’s
benevolence λ, the institutional setting should be designed such that the IPA
behaves as benevolently as possible.35 Because politically motivated policies
persist in many (less developed) countries, this insight is not particularly
helpful. But our model further suggests that industrial policies have a posi-
tive eﬀect on welfare even if the IPA is highly politically motivated given that
the institutional setting allows only for modest industrial policies. Modest
industrial policies are eﬀective because any IPA that cares at least marginally
about social welfare supports ﬁrst projects it expects to be proﬁtable. Mod-
est industrial policies can most easily be achieved by restricting the IPA’s
budget Ω. Proposition 4 implies that the welfare eﬀect of industrial policy is
maximized if Ω = Ω′. The budget should therefore not only be smaller, the
more politically motivated the IPA, but also the worse its information, the
higher the variability in the entrepreneurs’ distances from the IPA, the rarer
proﬁtable projects and the lower the social returns to these projects.
Alternatively, one can attain modest industrial policies, i.e. industrial
policies that increase welfare even if the IPA is highly politically motivated,
by appointing bureaucrats with a relatively hostile attitude towards en-
trepreneurs, i.e. by making µθ relatively low. Notice the similarity to the
well-known argument that society may be best served by a conservative cen-
tral banker.
The possible presence of rent seeking is yet another reason for ensur-
ing that industrial policies are modest because entrepreneurs with proﬁtable
projects are then more likely to engage in rent seeking than those with un-
proﬁtable projects, which, in turn, leads to a socially superior allocation of
the IPA’s budget. The same could alternatively be achieved by ensuring that
beneﬁts from public support are small (if not zero) for entrepreneurs with
unproﬁtable projects. This however is probably more diﬃcult to enforce than
35One could e.g. make the IPA relatively independent (like many central banks) to reduce
its exposure to strong political groups; this would however also reduce its accountability.
Alternatively, one could link the IPA’s future budget to its current performance, i.e. to
the share of supported projects that are proﬁtable. If this could be done credibly, the
IPA would have a stronger incentive to support projects it expects to be proﬁtable rather
than projects of close entrepreneurs. In addition, one could introduce performance-linked
wages for bureaucrats.
28a limited budget.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the government or the IPA could,
under certain conditions, foster development without active interventions
simply by sharing its knowledge. Since this passive policy requires no public
investment into private projects, it is more diﬃcult to misuse. It might
therefore be a serious alternative to active industrial policies - given that it
could indeed foster development - if public investment costs and the IPA’s
political motivation are relatively high.
6 Conclusions
We have presented an industrial policy model with both market and gov-
ernment failures. On the one hand, this model helps us to understand why
the same industrial policies that have failed elsewhere have been relatively
successful in South Korea and Taiwan. It shows how competent bureaucrats,
ethnic homogeneity among entrepreneurs, intensive communication between
bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, and the readiness to cut public support for
unproﬁtable projects may all have contributed to the success of industrial
policies in these countries. On the other hand, this model provides some
guidance as to the institutional setting under which industrial policies may
work. In particular, it has highlighted an asymmetry in how diﬀerent govern-
ment failures should be handled: Incompetent public agencies should lead to
the abandonment of industrial policies since they render any industrial policy
ineﬀective, whereas highly politically motivated public agencies are merely a
reason for modest industrial policies. Given that the public agencies’ budget
is suﬃciently small (or that public agencies are suﬃciently hostile), industrial
policies are eﬀective even if public agencies are highly politically motivated,
because any public agency ﬁrst supports close entrepreneurs with projects it
expects to be proﬁtable.
This latter result asks for a nuanced view on industrial policies: Those
who claim that industrial policies cannot work because of rampant gov-
ernment failures should be aware that modest industrial policies may even
work if public agencies are highly politically motivated; and those who claim
that industrial policies are necessary to circumvent rampant market failures
should be aware that in reality modest industrial policies will be more likely
29to work than generous industrial policies. Notice that this implication is in
stark contrast to the belief that successful development requires the govern-
ment (or international donors) to ﬁnance a big push.36
Even though our model has proved helpful to get reasonable answers to
the questions posed in the introduction, we are convinced that further re-
search on the interactions between market and government failures is needed
to improve our understanding of the possibilities and dangers associated with
industrial policies. We think that our model could provide a good basis for
this research.
Finally, we would like to highlight two policy implications for interna-
tional donors that follow from our model. First, international donors should
convince governments in developing countries to choose an adequate institu-
tional setting for their industrial policies. This entails abandoning industrial
policies if public agencies lack competence, and choosing modest industrial
policies if public agencies are highly politically motivated. Second, for the
same reasons international donors should not provide ﬁnancial aid for exten-
sive industrial policies conducted by incompetent or highly politically moti-
vated public agencies.37 But insofar as convincing governments and public
agencies requires ﬁnancial ”incentives”, these policy implications are partly
conﬂicting. International donors must therefore act circumspectly to foster
development in places where people are already suﬀering from both market
failures and incompetent, highly politically motivated public authorities.
36The idea that industrialization requires a big push goes back to Rosenstein-Rodan
(1943). Murphy, Shleifer and Vishney (1989) and Rodrik (1996) provide relatively recent
models on industrialization and the big push. However, contrary to what is often argued,
these models do not imply that a big push requires public expenditures (Rodrik 2004).
37Our model suggests that massive aid payments to support industrial policies should
be harmful in most developing countries while modest aid payments might be eﬀective.
This is consistent with the (inconclusive) evidence of a hump-shaped relationship between
foreign aid and growth (e.g. Hansen and Tarp 2001, and Roodman 2004).
30Appendix A
This appendix attempts a brief summary of the debate about the role played
by industrial policies in South Korea, Taiwan and some other fast growing
East Asian countries. The focus on industrial policies is however not meant
to deny that export orientation, sound macroeconomic policies and the rapid
accumulation of physical and human capital may have been important.
In the 1970s and 1980s, when evidence accumulated that various East
Asian countries had been experiencing extraordinarily fast growth, many
economists argued that these countries were free-market, free-trade economies
with very limited government interventions (see e.g. Balassa 1988).
This view was challenged by a series of ”revisionist” contributions in the
late 1980s arguing that industrial policies were used in most fast growing
East Asian countries to foster development. The best-known contributions
are probably those of Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990). They provide an ex-
tensive account of various selective government interventions in South Korea
and Taiwan, respectively. Further, they both argue that these interventions
contributed substantially to these countries’ extraordinary performance.
In 1993, the World Bank published the East Asian Miracle report, in
which it argues that governments in South Korea, Taiwan and other East
Asian countries had indeed intervened systematically and often selectively,
but that these interventions were not the driving force behind the East Asian
miracle. Since then most economists have acknowledged that industrial poli-
cies have been present in various successful East Asian countries, but - due
to the lack of the counterfactual - there is still disagreement about the eﬀect
industrial policies have had on these countries’ performance: The eﬀect could
have been positive or negative, and substantial or of second order.
Given that no country (except Botswana) grew more rapidly than these
East Asian countries between, say, 1960 and 1985 (Summers and Heston
1988), it is implausible (but not impossible) that industrial policies had a
negative eﬀect and that growth would have been even faster in the absence
of industrial policies. The question of whether the (weakly) positive eﬀect of
industrial policies was small or substantial is, however, unresolved. But note
that even if industrial policies have had only a small positive eﬀect in East
Asia, this would still contrast with the signiﬁcant negative eﬀect industrial
31policies have had in most other countries.
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, it is suﬃcient to prove that

















































































































































if and only if κ < 1.
Appendix C
This appendix proves that r(sπ
e) > r(s0
e) if and only if condition (29) holds.
It directly follows from deﬁnition (28) that r(sπ
e) > r(s0
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Since se contains no information about sg in addition to its information about














































e) if and only if condition (29) holds.
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